The basic aim and objective of this paper is to understand the concept of legal disability under limitation law.
This article is an attempt to analyse rules relating to the concept of legal disability. This concept is enshrined in Section 6 of the statute of Limitation Act, 1963. This concept also extends to other sections 7, 8 and 9 which play an important role in this concept. This concept can be described as some kind of cooling off period wherein individuals or their legal representatives of any form cannot file suits because of any legally induced disability- either insanity, idiocy or minor age. They can do so only once this disability is over.
This legal concept can be termed as some kind of eligibility criteria that allows/disallows parties from contesting their legal claims. This area of law can termed to be strictly time bound and allows concessions only when there is existence of some extra-ordinary circumstances that justifies any corresponding extension.
This project aims at deriving a focal point, to inter-mingle the Constitutional and other statutory relations pertaining to this concept and will also try to throw some light on the judicially settled principles. This write up seeks to bring up the legal provisions regarding law of legal disability and exceptions therein enshrined in Section 6, 7 & 8 of Limitation Act, 1963.
Also, thepapertries to establish a fair idea pertaining to the recent development that has been carried out in the Indian judicial sphere through various land mark judgments pronounced by the judiciary applying its legal mind.
Key Words: legal, disability, claims, limitations, judicial pronouncements.
The object of law of limitation is in accordance with the maxim, interest reipublicaeut sit finis litiumwhich means the interest of State requires that there should be an end to litigation.
The object of the law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by party’s own inaction, negligence or laches.
The ‘Law of Limitation’ prescribes the time-limit for different suits within, which an aggrieved person can approach the court for redress or justice.
The law of limitation is basically and prima facie, a rule of procedure, stating thereby the remedy can be exercised only within a limited period and not subsequently. It does not create any right or create causes of action. Similarly it should be read in a sense that limitation as distinguished from prescription merely bars remedy but does not destroy the right. So law of limitation gives a clarion call that court cannot assist those who are lethargic, apathetic or prone to sleeping over the matter. So, that being the position and specialty of law of limitation, the provisions of this act has to be construed strictly. Equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the word is the only safe guide.
Thus, the law of limitation is a statute of peace and repose and is based on the principle of public policy and a principle of vigilance.
“The limitation for institution of a legal action is a limitation on the availability of a legal remedy during a certain period of time. Different periods are prescribed for various remedies. The idea is that every legal action must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. The object of legal remedy is to repair a damage caused by reason of a legal injury suffered by the suitor. A legal remedy therefore, can never come into existence before a legal injury occurs. It is legal injury that calls legal remedy to life and action. The case of limitation fixes the life span of a legal remedy for the redress of a legal injury. It is not conceivable that the legislature would fix the limitation to run from a point earlier to the occurring of a legal injury and consequently before a legal remedy could have come into existence. Jurisprudentially therefore a period limitation can only start running after an injury occurred and appropriate remedy springs up into action.”
But there can be circumstances where due to his physical or mental disability he is unable to file the suit or make an application. In such cases the law must not be the same and special privileges and relaxation must be given to the persons undergoing legal disability.The Limitation Act mainly helps the defendants as it bars the filing of suit or making of application after the expiry of the limitation period. But in some cases Limitation Act even comes to the rescue of the plaintiff also.And the same circumstances give keys to enumeration of section 6 and 7 in Limitation Act, 1963.
TYPES OF LEGAL DISABILITY-
There are three types of legal disabilities that have been described in the Limitation act, 1963 . These includes-
The first of these criterions for legal disability, “minor” has to do with a person’s age. Under Section 3 (1) of The Indian Majority Act of 1875 , a person becomes a major when he/shecompletes eighteen years. This computation of age is to be done after taking into account the following two provisos discussed in section 3 (2) –
- The day on which the said individual is born is to be included as a whole day.
- He/she is thus said to have become a major as and when the eighteenth anniversary of that day commences.
The Majority Act of 1875 can be termed as a “secular “ law as it applies to all individuals professing any religion in India .If a particular personal law states otherwise, only then can the age of majority be considered as something else other than 18 years . The Majority Act though takes into account certain situations where in a concerned court or a court of wards took superintendence over the life and property of a minor and thus for his/her welfare appointed any guardian before such a person attained the age of 18, in such cases it is to be observed that the age of minority then extends till the age of 21 for the person in question. A child in the womb is also termed as a minor.
The second criterion for applying the bar of legal disability is that of insanity. This concept is explained in great detail in the case of S.K.Yadav V State of Maharashtrathat was contested in the Supreme Court. In this case the court dealt with the concept of insanity in our legal system at great length. It stated that courts only recognized legal insanity and not medical insanity and that there were substantial differences between the two. Even if insanity has been previously proved medically or in a lower court of law, it has to be proved in the higher court. Furthermore, it is to be noticed that no such specific tests lie to prove legal insanity. Behaviours, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, are to be taken into account while considering if a said person is to be termed insane or not.
In the case of Hari Singh Gond V State of Madhya Pradesh, it was said that there were four sub-types of non-compos mentis i.e., (1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by illness (3) a lunatic or a mad man and (4.) one who is drunk. Idiocy included the following characteristics which included-(a) non-sane memory from birth by a perpetual infirmity, without lucid intervals (b) idiots are unable to count twenty(c) tell the days of the week(d) who do not know their fathers or mothers, or the like.
A lunatic suffers from bouts of such attacks in between what is termed as periods of sanity i.e. there are times when he can control his senses but there are occasions where he/she functions in an erratic manner, example-epilepsy. Madness is seen as permanent. Lunacy and madness are termed “acquired insanity” while idiocy is considered as “natural insanity” that is while a person can turn lunatic at any time in his lifetime, a person is an idiot since his/her birth.
RULES PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN LIMITATION ACT
Section 6 –
General Principle: The general principle of law is that time does not run against a minor. This section does not provide for a fresh starting point of limitation. It means that the person under disability is entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period mentioned in the Schedule calculated from the cessation of disability (subject to the limit mentioned in S.8).
Who is entitled to the benefit of s. 6: It is only a person “entitled to the suit” that can claim benefit of s. 6. A person who was not entitled to sue or apply at the commencement of the limitation but becomes entitled to do so later cannot get benefit of s. 6.
Section 6 is applicable to the case where there is either one plaintiff or applicant and he is a minor or an idiot or insane or where there are several plaintiffs or defendants and they all labor under the disability or disabilities mentioned in s. 6. Where after the limitation has started running against one person, another person becomes entitled to sue on the same cause of action, s. 6 is not attracted and there is no fresh starting point of limitation and the disability of the latter at the time when he becomes entitled to sue is no ground for extending the limitation under s. 6.
Computation of period: In computing the period of limitation for a minor, the date on which he attains majority must be excluded from calculation. The minor, in bringing a suit after attaining majority, is also entitled to the benefit of s. 4. Therefore, if on the last day after three years from the date when the minor attained majority he ought to have filed a suit but the court is closed, he can file his suit on the reopening day. Section 6 does not prevent running of limitation but only extends the period of limitation.
The privilege given to the minors or others under the section is not one that can be availed of by the persons in disability alone. But his guardian or next friend can also bring a suit or make an execution application within three years from the date on which the disability of the person concerned ceases, even though the ordinary period of limitation for such suit or application has expired. The plaintiffs as minor or lunatics can bring a suit during disability and no objection can be taken that the suit is barred by limitation. They are protected by s. 6. The mere fact that there was a guardian on his behalf who could have filed the suit earlier would not deprive a minor of the protection given by the section.
Duty of litigant to plead minority: If the question of minority is not raised by a litigant or on his behalf the court is not bound to consider it ex propriomotu. Even the fact that The petitioner is described in the heading of the application as a minor represented by a guardian is not sufficient to entitle him to the benefit of this section, nor is it sufficient to throw upon the court the duty of protecting his interests by raising a point of this kind on his behalf. The omission on the part of the court to consider the question of minority of the petitioner does not amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction so as to invoke the revisional power of the High Court under s. 115 CPC. The point about the minority of a party for the purpose of calling in aid the provisions of this section cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal.
The person claiming disability has the onus to prove satisfactorily that he has come within three years of attainment of majority.
Accrual of cause of action: Section 6 only applies when the disability is in existence at the time when the limitation begins to run, but time is not saved where disability does not exist at the point on which limitation begins to run. This section requires that the plaintiff must have been a minor when the cause of action first accrued, and the cause of action must have accrued to the minor himself, otherwise he cannot claim any exemption under this section. Therefore, if the cause of action accrued to the minor’s father, the minor son cannot, after his father’s death, wait till he attains majority. Similarly, if the cause of action had accrued before his birth, the minor cannot, on coming of age avail himself of the benefit of this section. The minor must have been in existence at the time when the cause of action accrued.
If the suit is brought within three years of the attainment of the first plaintiff, the suit is within time in respect of the other plaintiff who were born after the date of alienation, even though in their case the ordinary period of limitation has run out; this is so because the younger brothers have no independent right to sue, but their right is derived from their elder brother’scapacity to sue; the time within which they can sue is co-existence with the time allowed to the elder brother
LEGAL DIABILITY U/S 6 AND COMBINATION WITH OTHER SECTIONS OF LIMITAION ACT 1963-
A major part of rules pertaining to legal disability are enshrined in its parent act, which is that of Limitation Act, especially sections 6,7 and 9 that describe with a great deal of detail the different aspects of technical acumen. These sections ably support one another. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is a very important section. It deals with the different time periods that are to be allowed to parties to file cases, beyond which the concept of limitation debars parties from filing any suits. However, it is to be noticed that this section also provides for some exceptions- in cases of extraordinary situations that lie in sections 4-24 of the Limitation Act . Minority, idiocy and insanity are the different grounds under sections 6 and 7 of the act that allow parties to file suits after the time period when the disability is over. The disability has to compulsorily exist at the time from which period of limitation is supposed to begin. After such a time period has already begun, no subsequent disability can lead to resetting of this clock as per section 9 of the Limitation Act . A per section 6 (2), if a person is suffering from multiple disabilities i.e. at least two or if such a person has got rid of one form of disability and is suffering from a new one, then in such situations he/she can only file a suit after these multiple disabilities or the newer disability has ceased to exist . Section 8 makes it amply clear that the concept or pre-emptive action does not exist in this case and that the time period for limitation is three years after the death of such a person or the ceasing of his disability .
Section 8 is ancillary to and restrictive of the concession granted in ss. 6 and 7, and does not confer any substantial privilege. This section is in the nature of a proviso to ss. 6 and 7. Example, where the father as manager makes an alienation on behalf of himself and his three minor sons and the eldest son attains majority 2 years before the death of the father, a suit for partition and separate possession by the sons of their 2/3rd share on the ground that the alienation by the father was not binding on them, filed more than three years after the death of the father but within three years after the attainment of majority by the majority by the youngest son is barred because the eldest son was competent to sue within three years after the death of the father.
The Supreme Court has held that the combined effect of s. 6 and s. 8 read with the third column of the appropriate Article of the Limitation Act would be that a person under disability may sue within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the schedule but the special limitation as an exception has been provided in s. 8 laying down that the extended period after cessation of disability would not be beyond three years of the cessation of disability or the death of the disabled person. It has also be pointed out by the Supreme Court that in each case the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting point of limitation from the date of cessation of disability, subject to the condition that in no case the period extended by this process under s. 6 or s. 7 shall exceed three years from the date of cessation of disability.
Extension: The present section adds as a proviso to s. 6 that in no case the period be extended to anything beyond three years from the cessation of the disability. Under this section the period can be extended up to an extent of three years, if under ordinary law out of the period of limitation prescribed, there remains a period of less than three years for bringing the suit. But if the period remaining is more than three years, no extension can be granted.
The period of limitation shall be computed from the cessation of disability or death of the person affected by the disability. The plaintiff has therefore to prove that he attained majority within three years of filing of the suit. The benefit of ss. 6 to 8 cannot be availed of by the partner or assignee of the person in disability. When a period of limitation prescribed for a suit is longer than three years, there are two courses open to the minor. He may file the suit within the prescribed period as given in the schedule of the Limitation Act, if the prescribed period expires during his minority or if does not expire during his minority he can wait for the full course of time to run and then before the expiry of the period prescribed institute the suit. In the alternative he may take advantage of the provisions of s. 8 and file the suit within three years of the cessation of disability. When s. 8 speaks of cessation of disability it means cessation of the disability arising from the want of the capacity of the group to give a valid discharge. That discharge would cease when one in the group acquired the capacity to give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the others.
Pre-emption suit: The extended period of limitation under s. 6 or s. 7 does not apply to pre-emption suits. As right of pre-emption should be immediately asserted minority or other disability would not excuse laches in assertion of the right.
RULES PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY IN CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 –
There are some provisions pertaining to legal disability in Civil Procedure Code of 1908. Some of these sections are-
- Under order 8 rule 5(1) of the CPC, it has been said that if a specific charge has not been denied specifically or not admitted by a defendant then it would be admitted specifically except against those persons suffering from legal disabilities.
- Section 6 (3) of limitation act of 1963 empowers legal representatives to file a suit after the death of a person suffering from legal disability, this provision is supported by order 22 rule 3 (1) of the CPC that makes legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff party to a suit.
- Under rule 4A of order 22, the court can appoint an administer General or an officer of the court as it thinks fit to represent the estate of the deceased person, in case there are no legal representatives left.
- Under rule 1 (1) of order 23 of the CPC, a suit where the plaintiff is a minor or any other person to whom rules 1 to 14 of order 31 extend, then a suit can be withdrawn only after the court has been satisfied as explained in rule 3 of order 23 on the grounds of formal defect or existence of grounds to file a fresh suit. In the case of JoannalaSura Reddy v. TiyyaguraSrinivasa it was said that no fresh suit can be filed if the previous suit has not been withdrawn after taking the court’s consent under rules1and 3 of order 23.
- Under rule 12 of Order 32 of CPC, which deals with suits filed by minors on them attaining majority, it was said in the case of VidyaWat v. Hans Raj, that under the specific provision mentioned above no dismissal of the suit is needed in case minor has decided not to pursue the matter after attaining majority.
The section will not grant an indulgence to a minor entitled to prefer an appeal, it provides only for suit or application for execution of decree.
Section 6 does not cover a case of an application under order 21, Rule 90,of CPC 1908 and through the same court set aside a sale held in execution in the case Bholanath v. sayedatunnisia. Nor it does apply to an application for the readmission of an appeal under Order 41 rule 10, of CPC.It is not applicable for bringing on record legal representative of a deceased party.An application to obtain a final decree for sale in mortgage suit is not an application for execution of the preliminary decree for sale. Section 6 does not apply to such an application.Similarly an application for supplementary decree under order 34, rule 6, is not an application for execution and does not fall within the provision of this section.
But claim for under section 110A of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 is in the nature of a suit under CPC, so it would attract the provision of section 6 of limitation Act.
RELEVANT CASE LAWS PERTAINING TO LEGAL DISABILITY-
While this list is not exhaustive, it aims to cover important cases across several high courts and Supreme Courts that can be termed to be very crucial in having developed practices associated with the mechanism of legal disability. These include-
- Darshan Singh v.Gurdev Singh – Section 6 allows the minor to extend the limitation to some more time and entitles the minor, insane or idiot to institute the suit or make the application within the same period prescribed in the third column of the Schedule to the Act after the said legal disability has come to an end. Special limitation explained in Section 8 of the act has explained that extended period after cessation of the disability will not cover beyond three years of the death of such legally disabled person or cessation of his said legal disability. In each case, the plaintiff is considered to be empowered by section 8 to a fresh starting period of limitation from the date of cessation of disability, which is consequently subject to the condition that the period of such extension under Section 6 or 7. The plaintiff can thus file a suit within this time period before limitation debars it.
- UdhavjiAnandjiLadha andOrs. v.BapudasRamdasDarbar – Section 6 does not cover in any way any “intervening” kind of legal disability. When a legal disability is in existence, only then can section 6 be successfully applied. But if a person cannot be termed to be suffering from any kind of legal disability when such a limitation time-line begins, he cannot in any way avail the relaxation of standards offered by section-6. While reading Section 3, the period of limitation for suits has to be considered by reading Schedule 1 with Sections 4 to 25of the Limitation Act; and, therefore prescribed for a suit by a minor cannot be the period mentioned in Schedule 1, but a special period that is described in Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, in the case of a minor it cannot be said that the period for filing suits under section 6 has expired without taking into account the provisos involved. This ensures that the right of minors to contest suits is not taken away, without offering them any reasonable time period to do so accordingly.
- Dharamchand and Ors. – This case stated that cause of action or grievance must take place when the plaintiff (in this particular case the administratrix) dies and the period of limitation is thus initiated with no subsequent disability leading to reset of that clock as per section 9 of the Limitation Act. A plaintiff can only rightfully claim benefit only if such a right existed due to a legal disability as and when the period of limitation began. Any subsequent disability on his part will not stop the running of limitation. Consequently, he will be governed by the same period of limitation as the earlier limited owner, but such a disability can come into his defence if his claims are independent of the earlier claimant’s plea.
- BapuTatya Desai vsBalaRaojee Desai– This case stated the purpose of section 7 of the Limitation act is to regulate the supposed indulgence that is available to minors to ensure that the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation act does not extend to a correspondingly long period of time but only till the eldest of the lot does not end up as a major.
- Usha Rani Banerjee &Ors. v. Premier Insurance Company Ltd– Section 7 had to be taken as an exception to the general principle enunciated by Section 6 and held that if there are multiple individuals that were jointly entitled to institute a suit and if one of them was disabled, time would not run against any of them until the disability ceased to exist. But if one of the persons entitled to institute the suit was competent to give discharge without the concurrence of the other, then time would begin to run against both of them.
- Kunhammad and Ors. v. M. Narayanan Nambudiri’s Son – If under some substantive law, a particular law entitles that a legally able person can represent an entire group, he/she can be termed to be powerful enough to discharge that right without any consultation with the other members of that group. Section 7 would not operate in the case of all the joint creditors under disability were well covered by Section 6 of the Act. It is not considered important whether a valid discharge is given by the person competent to
- RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY LAW COMMISSION-
The Law Commission of India in its eight-ninth report in 1963, focused on the Limitation act and thus came up with the following pieces of recommendations which included the following parts specifically on legal disability –
- The Limitation act dealt with the concept of legal disability amply within sections 6-8 of the act, with section 9 acting as a proviso of sorts.
- The commission came up with the idea of not having any pre-emptive concept of legal disability in this act as they felt that firstly pre-emption as a concept worked on a very small time frame and the legislature at multiple junctions felt that there was no severe need to bring this in. There were several special provisions for extending the time period, hence no such further addition was supposed to be necessary .
- The commission also felt that the grammatical aspects of some sections could be improved. It was suggested that section 7 should be re-drafted to do away with the expression of “time will not run” in order to do away with any ensuing confusion.
Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that the Law Commission of India has on occasions felt that laws pertaining to legal disability have been drafted well enough to suggest only one change.
Thus we can understand from the above examples that law of Limitation and Condonation of Delay are two effective implementations in the quick disposal of cases and effective litigation. On the one hand the law of limitation keeps a check on the pulling of cases and prescribes a time period within which the suit can be filed and the time available within which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The law of Condonation of Delay keeps the principle of natural justice alive and also states the fact that different people might have different problem as and the same sentence or a singular rule may not apply to all of them in the same way. Thus it is essential to hear them and decide accordingly whether they fit in the criteria of the judgment or whether they deserve a second chance.
Thus, after analysing the various aspects of the mechanism of legal disability-its definitions, its components, its developmental history, the various important case-laws etc, I conclude that this mechanism in the Limitation act has far reaching ramifications that can systematically extend over a long period of time. This law is primarily meant for usage by legally discredited individuals and their legal representatives to rightfully claim within a reasonable time period what is rightfully theirs. Since, such individuals are not legally entitled to file suits for such purposes; there can be occasions where they are wrongfully deprived of their claims and dues. It is meant to ensure that legal insanity or minority does not in any way deprive such persons of their legal rights. However, this defensive mechanism could also be potentially misused and thus several caveat provisions like that of the three year period have been introduced to keep a fair check on both the sides involved in a dispute. This concept has been shaped importantly by various case laws decided by different high courts as well as the Supreme Court. The Law commission on the contrary, has felt that the law is reasonably clear; it is amply evident from the fact that in their previous reports they have suggested just one change that of in section 7. However, on a personal level, I feel that this very law is very much accurate and is ably supported by the judicial machinery to ensure negligible misuse of its provisions.
P RamanathaAiyar’s Concise Law Dictionary, page 674, Lexis Nexis Fifth Edition
Rajindar Singh v. Santa, AIR 1973 SC 2537
Kashiram v. Kundanlal, AIR 1956 All 660 (DB)
First National Bank v. SantLal, AIR 1959 Punj 328
The Ramanathapuram Market Committee, Virudhunagar v. East India Corporation Ltd., Madurai, AIR 1976 Mad 323
ShaikhLayak v. State of A.P,(1981)2 Andh. WR 64
 The Limitation Act, 1963, Section 6
The Indian Majority Act, 1875, Section 3 (1).
Bajpai,Asha,“Who is a child?”, www.infochangeindia.org,2007,
 The Limitation Act, 1963, page 7.
S.K.Yadav V State of Maharashtra, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.509 of 2008).
 AIR 2009 SC 768
PonnammaPilai v. PadmanabhanChannar, AIR 1969 Ker. 163
Bailchon Karan v. BasantKumariNaik, AIR 1999 SC 876
Zafir v. Amiruddin, AIR 1963 Pat.108
Abed hossain v. Abdul Rahman, ILR (1935)63, Cal. 92
Shah Hiralal v. Shah Fulchand, AIR 1956 Sau 90
I.S. Mohammad v. N.A.N. Mohammad, AIR 1984 Guj. 126
PonnammaPilai v. PadmanabhanChannar, AIR 1969 Ker. 163 (FB)
Tulsiram v. Kishori Prasad, AIR 1962 Pat 189
Electricity Board of UP v. SheoNath Singh, AIR 1976 All. 118
PanchuMandal v. Sheikh Isaf, 17 CWN 667
Harikumar v. Udeyram, AIR 1972 Bom. 262
GopiNath v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1962 All. 53
 Firm Dunichand v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1935 Lah 144
Kasim v Sip, AIR 1956 Sau 20
Supra Note 13
Jowala v. Sant Singh, AIR 1932 Lah. 605
 The Limitation Act,1963
Takwani, C.K., Civil Procedure Code with Limitation Act,1963,Seventh Edition, 2013, Page-787
Ibid. at 791
 The Limitation Act, 1963, sec. 6 (2)
 The Limitation Act, 1963, sec. 8
Rangaswami v. Thangavelu, 42 Mad 637
Janardan v. Nilkantha, AIR 1952 Ori. 31
KalandavelGounder v. Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Mad 541S
Vasudeva v. Maguni, 24 Mad 387
Supra Note 18
Kuntappa v. A.K. Desai, AIR 1973 Mys. 50
Abdul Padia v. Dinbandhu, AIR 1960 Ori 15
Nanhe khan v. Ganpati, AIR 1954 Hyd. 45
Supra Note 18
SurajBhan v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1972 Punj. 276
Vishwanathan v. Ethirajulu, 19220 45 MLJ 389
 The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 8 rule 5 (1).
The Limitation Act, 1963, sec. 6 (3)
 The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 22 rule 3 (1).
The Code of Civil Procedure 1908, order 22 rule 4 A.
 AIR 2004 AP 222,
AIR 1993 Del 187
AIR 1943 Mad. 55
Sonubhai v. Shivaji Rao, 45 Bom 648
ShilaWanti v. Kishore Chand, AIR 1933 Cal. 508
Govindnaik v. Bassawannewa, AIR 1941 Bom 203
KondkarMahomed v. Chandra Kumar, 56 Cal. 1117
Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 1995 AIR 75, 1994 SCC (6) 585.
DhavjiAnandjiLadha and Ors.v. BapudasRamdasDarbar, AIR 1950 Bom 94.
LalchandDhanalal v. Dharamchand and Ors., AIR 1965 MP 102.
BapuTatya Desai vsBalaRaojee Desai, (1920) 22 BOMLR 1383,
 AIR 1983 Allahbad 27
T. Kunhammad and Ors. Vs M. Narayanan Nambudiri’s Son, AIR 1964 Ker 8.
 Law Commission of India, Eighty Ninth report on The Limitation Act, 1963.
Ibid, Chapter 16,para 16-E.
Ibid, Chapter 44,para 4.